Alasdair Macintyre’s Aristotelian Business
Ethics: A Critique

ABSTRACT. This paper begins by summarizing and
distilling MacIntyre’s sweeping critique of modern busi
ness. It identifies the crux of MacIntyre’s critique as
centering on the fundamental Aristotelian concepts of
internal goods and practices. MacIntyre essentially follows
Aristotle in arguing that by privileging external goods
over internal goods, business activity – and certainly
modern capitalistic business activity – corrupts practices.
Thus, from the perspective of virtue ethics, business is
morally indefensible. The paper continues with an eval
uation of MacIntyre’s arguments. The conclusion is
drawn that MacIntyre’s critique, although partially valid,
does not vitiate modern business as he claims. In short,
modern business need not of necessity be antithetical to
individuals’ pursuit of internal goods within practices.
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which MacIntyre addresses speciﬁcally his views on
business, provide a much richer and more nuanced
picture of MacIntyre’s ‘anti-business’ stance than can
be gleaned simply from After Virtue. What I hope to
show below is that MacIntyre can be more accu
rately characterized as a critic of a certain type of
business, rather than as a critic of business per se. In
addition, MacIntyre is not just a critic. He also
provides a lucid alternative vision of business activ
ity. His alternative vision is undoubtedly radical in
that it essentially rejects capitalism, but it is a uniﬁed
alternative vision nonetheless.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol
lows. First, I summarize MacIntyre’s central Aristo
telian thesis. Second, I critique his nuanced critique
of modern business. Finally, I summarize and eval
uate his radically alternative ‘anti-capitalist’ vision of
business activity.

Introduction
As one of the most inﬂuential and controversial
living philosophers, Alasdair MacIntyre is most well
known for his book After Virtue, in which he pro
vides a sweeping and historically based critique of
modernity. His other works, of which there are
many, are less well known. This is particularly true
among business ethicists who, based on After Virtue,
tend to dismiss MacIntyre as simply ‘anti-business’.
Other business ethicists attempt to usefully apply
certain tenets of MacIntyre’s work while avoiding
his broad critique of business. However, what is
lacking in the business ethics literature is any eval
uative critique of MacIntyre’s views on business in
totem.
My purpose here is to undertake just such an
evaluation. Although After Virtue is one source here,
I also draw on many less-known contributions
to MacIntyre’s oeuvre. These latter writings, in

MacIntyre’s Aristotelian vision of business
What exactly, according to MacIntyre, precludes
individuals within a corporation from exercising the
virtues? Why can we not have a virtuous corpora
tion? What is it about virtue ethics that excludes
competitive economic activity from the moral
realm? MacIntyre, following in the tradition of
Aristotle and Aquinas, answers these questions in
depth. He concludes that ‘‘… the tradition of the
virtues is at variance with central features of
the modern economic order …’’ (1984, p. 254). In
the remainder of this section I endeavor to distill the
essence of his argument, an argument that rests on
two key concepts, namely that of a practice and of an
internal good.
For an individual to successfully cultivate the
virtues requires that that individual be engaged in

a type of cooperative activity known – in virtueethics parlance – as a practice. Thus a necessary con
dition for a business person to be virtuous is that
communal business activity qualiﬁes as a type of
practice. But does it? MacIntyre deﬁnes a practice as:
any coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the
course of trying to achieve those standards of excel
lence which are appropriate to, and partially deﬁnitive
of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions
of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended. (1984, p. 187)

In a similar vein Barry Schwartz (1990) isolates
three central features of practices:
1. They establish their own standards of excel
lence, and indeed, are partly deﬁned by those
standards.
2. They are teleological, that is, goal directed.
Each practice establishes a set of ‘‘goods’’ or
ends that is internal or speciﬁc to it, and
inextricably connected to engaging in the
practice itself. In other words, to be engaging
in the practice is to be pursuing these inter
nal goods.
3. They are organic. In the course of engaging
in the practice, people change it, systemati
cally extending both their own powers to
achieve its goods, and their conception of
what its goods are.
From these deﬁnitions it is clear that the concept
of an internal good is crucial to the notion of a
practice. But what exactly is an internal good that
distinguishes it from an external good? Here MacIntyre builds directly from Aristotle. In the Nico
machean Ethics, Aristotle begins with the fundamental
observation that all human activity aims ultimately to
achieve some perceived good: ‘‘Every art and every
enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the
good has rightly been declared to be that at which all
things aim’’ (1094a19). Aristotle splits goods into
internal and external. External goods are akin to
the conventional goods of economics, symbol
ized by material wealth and what it can provide:

security, honor, prestige, and power. MacIntyre
deﬁnes external goods as ‘‘always some individual’s
property or possession. Moreover characteristically
they are such that the more someone has of them,
the less there is for other people. … External goods
are therefore characteristically objects of competition
in which there must be losers as well as winners’’.
(1984, pp. 190–191)
Internal goods, in contrast, are characterized by
their physical intangibility. They are intrinsic satis
factions derived from some activity, and are often
related to the satisfactions derived from productive
crafts. Klein, for example, notes, ‘‘[t]he ideal of
craftsmanship is to create that which has quality or
excellence; personal satisfaction, pride in accom
plishment, and a sense of dignity derived from the
consequent self-development are the motivations’’
(1988, p. 55). Following the craft analogy, MacIn
tyre emphasizes the communal nature of internal
goods: ‘‘The aim internal to such productive crafts,
when they are in good order, is never only to catch
ﬁsh, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses.
It is to do so in a manner consonant with the
excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a
good product, but the craftsperson is perfected
through and in her or his activity’’ (1994, p. 284).
Chytry draws the distinction between the craftwork
and the commodity: ‘‘what immediately distin
guishes the craftwork from the commodity is the
former’s imbeddedness not so much in proﬁt or
value-creation motivations as in what used to be
celebrated as a ‘calling’ (Beruf) or vocation’’ (Chytry,
2007, p. 42).
This notion of a calling or vocation recognizes the
moral dimension of internal goods. A dimension
emphasized in Kekes’s general deﬁnition of internal
goods as ‘‘satisfactions involved in being and acting
according to our conceptions of good lives. …
internal goods are satisfactions involved in the suc
cessful exercise of some of our dispositions in the
context of a way of life to which we have committed
ourselves’’ (1988, p. 656). In a similar vein, MacIntyre relates internal goods to the concept of a
practice: ‘‘Internal goods are indeed the outcome of
competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them
that their achievement is a good for the whole
community who participate in the practice’’ (1984,
pp. 190–191).

Thus, in summary, internal goods possess three
distinct features:
1. They are unique to a particular activity. For
example, in the context of chess, MacIntyre
talks of ‘‘those goods speciﬁc to chess, … the
achievement of a certain highly particular kind
of analytical skill, strategic imagination and
competitive intensity …’’ (1984, p. 188). Thus
the internal goods to be derived from chess are
different from those to be derived from
accountancy, from badminton, or from archi
tecture. Fame, power, and money, therefore –
given their ubiquitous nature – are clearly not
internal goods.
2. They are not of ﬁnite supply. Thus my
achievement of any given internal good in
no way inhibits your achievement of similar
goods.
3. They are intangible in the sense that they do
not readily lend themselves to quantiﬁcation
or enumeration. This may explain why they
have been largely ignored by traditional eco
nomic theory.1
As MacIntyre argues in After Virtue, it is a cor
poration’s focus on external goods – on the goods of
effectiveness over and above the goods of excellence
– that disqualiﬁes it as a practice. A virtuous corpo
ration could not have an ultimate goal of economic
gain: ‘‘It is of the character of a virtue that in order
that it be effective in producing the internal goods
which are the rewards of the virtues it should be
exercised without regard to consequences’’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 198).
Some business ethicists note that the corporation
is a type of community, and they surmise from this
that it is an environment suitable for virtue ethics.
For example Solomon states that ‘‘[c]orporations are
real communities, neither ideal nor idealized, and
therefore the perfect place to start understanding the
nature of the virtues’’ (Solomon, 1992, p. 325).
What, according to MacIntyre, this view fails to
recognize is that the very nature of competitive
economic activity requires a primary focus on
external goods in order to survive. This focus will
exclude the virtues. As MacIntyre admits, ‘‘posses
sion of the virtues may perfectly well hinder us in
achieving external goods … [w]e should therefore

expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of
external goods were to become dominant, the
concept of the virtues might suffer at ﬁrst attrition
and then perhaps something near total effacement’’
(1984, p. 196).
Thus it is not just that the virtues are incompat
ible with capitalistic business, but also that such
business actually tends to drive out the virtues. To
illustrate this, MacIntyre depicts a ‘modern’ ﬁshing
community:
A ﬁshing crew may be organized as a purely technical
and economic means to a productive end, whose aim
is only or overridingly to satisfy as proﬁtably as possible
some market’s demand for ﬁsh. Just as those managing
its organization aim at a high level of proﬁts, so also the
individual crew members aim at a high level of reward.
… When however the level of reward is insufﬁciently
high, then the individual whose motivations and val
ues are of this kind will have from her or his own point
of view the best of reasons for leaving this particular
crew or even taking to another trade. … [M]anage
ment will from its point of view have no good reason
not to ﬁre crew members, and owners will have no
good reason not to invest their money elsewhere.
(1994, p. 285)

Here MacIntyre is describing contemporary
business. The above is clearly an organization
pursuing external goods in a competitive market
economy. This is not a virtuous ﬁshing crew. Spe
ciﬁcally, MacIntyre isolates three ‘‘central features of
the modern economic order’’ that exclude it from
the virtues. These are ‘‘individualism … acquisi
tiveness and its elevation of the values of the market
to a central social place’’ (1984, p.254). As a con
sequence, the actors within modern ﬁrms, namely
managers, compartmentalize themselves within the
conﬁnes of a morally stunted version of utilitarian
ism, namely cost-beneﬁt analysis. The milieu of the
modern ﬁrm renders them blind to considerations
beyond the ﬁnancial ‘bottom line.’
For example, in Utilitarianism and Cost-Beneﬁt
Analysis, MacIntyre observes that ‘‘once the execu
tive is at work the aims of the public or private
corporation must be taken as given. Within the
boundaries imposed by corporate goals and legal
constraints the executive’s own tasks characteristi
cally appear to him as merely technical … [the]
moral considerations underlying cost-beneﬁt analysis

are simply suppressed’’ (1977, pp. 218 and 237).
Similarly, in Social Structures and their Threats to Moral
Agency, MacIntyre discusses ‘‘a business corporation
whose chief executive ofﬁcer decides to exaggerate
the progress made by the corporation’s scientists on a
research project, with the aims both of not losing
customers to rivals and of bolstering share prices’’
(1999b, p. 322). MacIntyre argues that the ‘‘only
grounds on which objection to such deception can
be based, if it is to be heard, is that in the longer run
deception will fail to maximize corporate proﬁts’’
(p. 323).
Similarly, in After Virtue, in listing managers –
along with therapists and aesthetes – as one of the
principal ‘characters’ of modernity, MacIntyre argues
that managers ‘‘conceive of themselves as morally
neutral characters whose skills enable them to devise
the most efﬁcient means of achieving whatever end
is proposed. Whether a given manager is effective or
not is on the dominant view a quite different
question from that of the morality of the ends which
his effectiveness serves or fails to serve’’ (1984,
p. 74). And ﬁnally, in Why are the Problems of Business
Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre returns solidly to the
theme of compartmentalization: ‘‘With one part of
the self one is a corporate executive understanding
every project in terms of a suitably narrow con
ception of cost-beneﬁt analysis and ignoring large
side effects of one’s activity. … Effectiveness in
organizations is often both the product and the
producer of an intense focus on a narrow range of
specialized tasks which has as its counterpart a
blindness to other aspects of one’s activity’’ (1982,
pp. 357–358).
Another related criticism that MacIntyre levels
against the modern ﬁrm is that of myopia: ‘‘The
failure to be responsible for the future is not just a
product of the negligence of individuals, but is
rooted in the forms and tendencies of organizational
and corporate life’’ (1982, p. 357). He connects this
to the narrow focus on cost-beneﬁt analysis, which
he believes forces managers to set arbitrary, and likely
short-term, horizons; ‘‘in a private proﬁt-seeking
corporation the current rates of return expected on
investment will place constraints on such a choice of
dates …’’ (1977, p. 232). This is further reﬂected in
his depiction of the modern ﬁshing crew above: the
managers readily ‘‘invest their money elsewhere’’
when the ﬁsh stocks decline.

More broadly, in Corporate Modernity and Moral
Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, MacIntyre
lists ‘‘four ways the moral structure of the modern
corporate world can be deﬁned by negation – by the
striking absence of honor, of blasphemy, of cere
monial death, and of the story-telling elders’’ (1979,
p. 134). Corporate modernity, according to
MacIntyre, lacks a sense of ‘‘cosmic order’’ (ibid.,
p. 133) in which communal narrative, communal
recognition of birth and death, communal belief in
the divine, and a communal sense of honor and
insult can all play signiﬁcant roles. And more
recently MacIntyre has continued this criticism by
asserting, in Dependant Rational Animals, that marketbased relationships such as those within and between
modern ﬁrms ‘‘undermine and corrupt communal
ties’’ (1999a, b, p. 117).

Evaluating MacIntyre’s Aristotelian
business ethics
Is MacIntyre correct? Does the modern ﬁrm within
capitalism induce compartmentalization and myo
pia? Do the managers of modern ﬁrms frame every
decision in terms of a narrowly deﬁned cost-beneﬁt
analysis? Do they leave moral agency at the door
when they enter the boardroom?
Although the picture MacIntyre paints of modern
business undoubtedly illustrates many of the char
acteristics of contemporary corporate culture, he
paints with very broad brush-strokes. Modern ﬁrms
and the managers therein undoubtedly exhibit the
shortcomings that MacIntyre highlights. But the
evidence indicates that these ﬁrms and individuals
exhibit the shortcomings to a greater or lesser
degree. Also, these enterprises exhibit other, more
morally desirable, characteristics that are not con
sistent with MacIntyre’s characterization. In short,
for reasons summarized below, MacIntyre’s view
may be too narrow.
First, many managers do in fact devote nonsuperﬁcial moral reﬂection to their role as managers.
This is evidenced by the many ongoing ethics lec
ture-series held at many business schools in which
managers typically discuss their on-the-job moral
deliberations. These belie Macintyre’s claim that
‘‘there is no milieu available to them [managers] in
which they are able, together with others, to step

back from those roles and those requirements and to
scrutinize themselves and the structure of their
society from some external standpoint with any
practical effect’’ (1999b, p. 322).
It is not even necessary to look at the businessethics evidence. If we restrict ourselves to the
observations of writers who have no explicit concern
with ethics, we still ﬁnd compelling evidence that
MacIntyre’s rendition of the modern ﬁrm – and the
compartmentalized manager therein – is too narrow.
In The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Perfor
mance and Growth, John Roberts begins with the
statement: ‘‘The most fundamental responsibilities of
general managers are setting strategy and designing
the organization to implement it’’ (2004, p. ix). He
goes on to state that ‘‘Firms are institutions created
to serve human needs … to provide meaningful
experiences’’ (p. 18). He recognizes that this cannot
be achieved by applying only explicit criteria (such as
cost-beneﬁt analysis), evaluative criteria such as
corporate culture are equally important: ‘‘Culture is
the ‘softer’ stuff, but it is not less important for that.
It involves the fundamental shared values of the
people in the ﬁrm, as well as their shared beliefs
about why the ﬁrm exists, about what they are
collectively and individually doing, and to what
end’’ (p. 18). Note well that, in contradiction to
MacIntyre’s assertion, Roberts observes that man
agers do not take ends as given. It is also noteworthy
that Roberts bases his observations on experiences
gained from ‘‘the executives and managers at the
many companies I have been able to visit and study,
especially BP, General Motors, Johnson Controls,
Nokia, Novo Nordisk, Sony, and Toyota’’ (p. xi).
For example, in the case of Nokia: ‘‘People were
simply expected to do their best and were trusted to
act in the best interests of the company …
employees throughout the ﬁrm were motivated by
the desire to save the company. The successes they
collectively achieved were a source of real pride.’’
(pp. 174 and 276).
This description is strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s
prescription that the ‘‘aim internal to such productive
crafts, when they are in good order, is never only to
catch ﬁsh, or to produce beef or milk, or to build
houses. It is to do so in a manner consonant with the
excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a
good product, but the craftsperson is perfected
through and in her or his activity’’ (1994, p. 284).

So, in a book that never even mentions ethics,
Roberts observes the modern ﬁrm creating and
nurturing what MacIntyre argues it is quintessentially
incapable of creating and nurturing: namely practices.
Roberts’s experiences reveal a management psy
chology far deeper and more nuanced than merely a
rigid application of cost-beneﬁt analysis as MacIntyre
suggests. Indeed, Roberts concludes his book by
observing that ‘‘solving the problems of strategy and
organization is an act of real creativity’’ (p. 286).
As with Roberts, Michael Jensen resides ﬁrmly in
the camp of a ﬁnancial-economic perspective on the
ﬁrm. But, on the few occasions when Jensen does
venture into a broad discussion of the nature and
purpose of business, we again ﬁnd prescriptions
strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s utopian practicenurturing institution: ‘‘Value maximization is not a
vision or a strategy or even a purpose; … people …
must be turned on by the vision or the strategy in the
sense that it taps into some human desire or passion
of their own – for example, a desire to build the
worlds best automobile or to create a ﬁlm or play
that will move people for centuries’’ (2001, p. 16).
So here we see Jensen, albeit inadvertently, making a
distinction that can readily be seen as analogous to
that of internal and external goods; and note well
that for Jensen the internal goods are the motivator
and the external goods the way of ‘keeping score.’
He continues:
Value seeking tells an organization and its par
ticipants how their success in achieving a vision or in
implementing a strategy will be assessed. But value
maximizing or value seeking says nothing about how
to create a superior vision or strategy. Nor does it tell
employees or managers how to ﬁnd or establish
initiatives or ventures that create value. … Deﬁning
what it means to score a goal in football or soccer,
for example, tells the players nothing about how to
win the game. [Ibid]
Jensen’s soccer example invites parallels to Mac
Intyre’s discussion of the internal goods of chess:
‘‘those goods speciﬁc to chess, in the achievement of a
certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, stra
tegic imagination and competitive intensity’’ (1984,
p. 187). (And note well in passing that MacIntyre
views ‘competitive intensity’ – a foundational prin
ciple of capitalism – as an internal good.)
Finally from Jensen: ‘‘we must give employees
and managers a structure that will help them resist

the temptation to maximize short-term ﬁnancial
performance … short-term proﬁt maximization at
the expense of long-term value creation is a sure way
to destroy value’’ (op cit). This belies MacIntyre’s
claim that capitalism necessarily promotes myopia.
As Hart observes, ‘‘the ﬁrm must not only perform
efﬁciently in today’s businesses, but it should also be
constantly mindful of generating the products and
services of the future. This means developing or
acquiring the skills, competencies, and technologies
that reposition the ﬁrm for future growth. … A
convincing articulation of how and where the ﬁrm
plans to grow in the future is crucial to the gener
ation of shareholder value’’ (2007, pp. 63–64). So
whether involved in ﬁshing, farming, computer
software development, or all three, the modern
ﬁrm’s outlook is far from arbitrary or myopic.
Indeed, archeological evidence indicates that – at
least in the context of natural resource depletion –
pre-modern communities were the real sufferers
from myopia: ‘‘American Indians often so pressured
or depleted basic resources like land and trees that
they had to switch from one type of food to another
or move the locations of their villages’’ (Krech,
1999, p. 76); similarly, the indigenous pre-modern
culture of Easter Island collapsed when all the trees
on the island were felled (ibid.).

Conclusion
Returning to MacIntyre’s depiction of ﬁshing crews,
in contrast to the modern ﬁshing enterprise
described above, MacIntyre conjures another ‘Aris
totelian’ ﬁshing community:
Consider by contrast a crew whose members may well
have initially joined for the sake of their wage or other
share of the catch, but who have acquired from the rest
of the crew an understanding of and devotion to
excellence in ﬁshing and to excellence in playing one’s
part as a member of such a crew. … So the interde
pendence of the members of a ﬁshing crew in respect
of skills, the achievement of goods and the acquisition
of virtues will extend to an interdependence of the
families of crew members and perhaps beyond them to
the whole society of a ﬁshing village. (1994, p. 285)

Where might such communities actually exist, or
have existed? MacIntyre gives several examples:

Fishing communities in New England, Welsh min
ing communities, farming coops in Donegal, Mayan
towns in Guatemala and Mexico, ancient Greek city
states, Greek highland villages, medieval Christian
and Arab kingdoms, Scottish highland clans before
1600, the Sioux nation, Bedouin of the Western
desert, and the Irish of the Blasket Islands? (1982,
and 1999a).
But these examples reﬂect again the ‘broad-brush’
characteristic of MacIntyre’s vision. Although the
above communities undoubtedly possess or pos
sessed desirable attributes, they also undoubtedly
possessed many undesirable attributes. A focus on
internal goods, in and of itself, is not sufﬁcient to
render a community utopian, or even desirable.
Many members of these communities, particularly
those not in the power elite, were no doubt happy to
leave them behind and embrace capitalist modernity.
As Frazer and Lacey note: ‘‘Feminist theory under
stands male power exercised and maintained in and
through practices’’ (1994, p. 271).
In Dependant Rational Animals, MacIntyre argues
that utopia would be ‘‘inimical to and in conﬂict
with the goals of a consumer society’’ (1999a,
p. 145). But as Keat recently pointed out, ‘‘although
the acquisition of consumer ‘goods’ takes place
through exchange within the market (or economic)
domain, the realization of their value typically takes
place in non-market domains’’ (2007, p. 6, his
emphasis). For example, if I wish to pursue the
internal goods of chess, the market will not prevent
me from whittling my own chess pieces from a piece
of walnut if I so choose; but what it will do is present
me with a dizzying array of alternative chess sets; not
to mention some very sophisticated non-human
opponents. But note well the choice to participate in
the ‘consumer society’ is mine.
MacIntyre describes utopia in terms of ‘‘rejecting
the economic goals of advanced capitalism’’ (1999a,
p. 145). But his logic rests on the premise that
these economic goals corrupt other non-economic
goals – the types of goals people had in premodernity. But the evidence does not support this
premise; in fact it indicates the opposite. There is
now available a wealth of evidence to indicate that it
is precisely advanced capitalism in general and the
modern ﬁrm in particular that has engendered
human ﬂourishing. This evidence indicates a high
correlation between health, wealth, and happiness

for all demographic groups (Baumol et al., 2007;
Hart, 2007; Layard, 2005). And this includes the
elderly and disabled; the latter being groups
MacIntyre is particularly concerned about in
Dependant Rational Animals. Also, in The Moral
Consequences of Economic Growth (2005), Friedman
provides solid evidence to indicate that one essential
ingredient for communal moral health and happiness
is economic growth.
This is not to say that the modern ﬁrm, embraced
by capitalism, is perfect in the sense of always nur
turing internal goods within practices. But it at least
has provided unparalleled material wealth as a
foundation for practices. Capitalism is also ﬂexible
and continually evolving. MacIntyre’s critique might
be better used as a source of direction for this evo
lutionary process, rather than – as MacIntyre himself
tends to use it – as a ‘call-to-arms’ for capitalism’s
destruction.

Note
1

Recently, however, even economists are more read
ily recognizing notions of internal or intrinsic motiva
tion and satisfaction: Kreps, for example, challenges
economists’ conventionally -assumed inverse relation
between effort and utility when he suggests that
‘‘[w]orkers may take sufﬁcient pride in their work so
that effort up to some level increases utility’’ (1997,
p. 361). He acknowledges that this calls into question
conventional notions of motivation: ‘‘Answers involve
looking into the utility functions of individuals, terra
incognito for standard microeconomics’’ (p. 361). Sen,
who does venture into this terra incognito, warns of the
dangers ‘‘imposed by taking an overly narrow view of
human motivation’’ (1997, p. 750f).
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